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Bart Hobijn and Erick Sager
While homeland security is widely seen as an important national objective, the costs of this effort
are not well understood. An analysis of public and private expenditures on homeland security shows
that overall spending rose by $34 billion between 2001 and 2005—a clear increase but one that
represents a gain of only ¼ of 1 percent as a share of U.S. GDP. Private sector expenditures
increased very modestly in dollar terms and remained unchanged as a fraction of the sector’s GDP. 
S
ince the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, homeland security has become a key
concern for the public and private sectors.
Questions about the adequacy of existing security
arrangements have prompted both sectors to adopt new
policies as part of what the Office of Homeland Security
(2002) calls“a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States,reduce America’s vulnera-
bility to terrorism,and minimize the damage and recover
from attacks that do occur.”
Not surprisingly,the costs of this effort raise hard ques-
tions about U.S. resource allocation. Specifically, there is
concern that large-scale spending on security could hold
back economic growth by diverting labor and capital from
more productive uses.In this edition of Current Issues,we
shed light on this matter by quantifying the increase in
resources spent on homeland security between 2001 and
2005 and evaluating the impact of this spending on overall
U.S.economic activity and performance.
Our study is essentially an investigation of the cost side of
a cost-benefit analysis for homeland security spending.We
focus on only that side of such an analysis because estimat-
ing benefits is very difficult—involving,as it does,specula-
tion about counterfactuals,or what would have happened if
the spending had not taken place.Even with this narrowing
of focus,however,accounting for homeland security costs is
far from straightforward.While Congress has required the
federal government to provide a detailed accounting of
homeland security spending in the last five years,state and
local governments do not systematically report similar out-
lays.Moreover,only very limited information is available on
the amount of resources that the private sector has targeted
to security,and even less on resources devoted specifically to
homelandsecurity.
Because of these data limitations, we document the
change in homeland security costs in a series of steps.We
begin by reporting federal government outlays on home-
land security.We then review the available evidence on the
private sector’s security-related labor and capital expendi-
tures,arriving at what are,at best,crude measures of the
changes in this sector’s spending over the 2001-05 period.
Recognizing the weakness of these measures,we present
some additional sector-specific information on security
costs and consider whether there is macroeconomic evi-
dence of significant security outlays by the private sector.
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Our methodology,coupled with the limitations ofour private
sector measures, means that our estimates of homeland
security costs are best thought of as an upper bound.
We estimate that homeland security spending climbed
from $56.0 billion in 2001 to $99.5 billion in 2005.As a frac-
tion of nominal GDP,these dollar amounts translate into a rise
from 0.55 percent in 2001 to 0.80 percent in 2005.Increases in
federal government spending account for $34.2 billion of the
$43.5 billion rise in spending,while the remaining $9.4 billion
is attributable to increases in private sector resources de-
voted to homeland security.
These numbers point to a relatively small increase in the
share of resources targeted to homeland security in the post
9/11 period. Given this modest increase—as well as the
robust economic performance of the U.S. economy since
2001—we conclude that the broader economic impact of
higher security spending has been very limited.
Public Sector Spending on Homeland Security
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines the
homeland security effort as encompassing six main objec-
tives: intelligence and warning, border and transportation
s e c u r i t y ,d o m e s t i c  c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m ,p r o t e c t i o n  o fc r i t i c a l
infrastructure and key assets,defense against catastrophic
threats,and emergency preparedness and response.Chart 1
depicts the distribution of federal outlays over the six policy
objectives in 2005.Border and transportation security and
protection of critical infrastructure account for the prepon-
derance of homeland security spending.At the other end of
the spectrum,intelligence and warning constitutes,by far,the
smallest fraction of the homeland security budget—largely
because many intelligence expenditures do not fall directly
under the classification and jurisdiction ofhomeland security.
As reported in the OMB’s (2006) budget proposal for
fiscal year12007,total federal outlays on these six policy pri-
orities came to $54.3 billion in fiscal year 2005,an amount
roughly equal to 0.4 percent of GDP.This share of GDP was
twice as high as it was in 2001,when the $20.1 billion offederal
homeland security spending represented about 0.2 percent of
GDP.Current proposals for fiscal year 2007 include $58.3 bil-
lion in spending on homeland security,an amount that the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects to be 0.4 percent
of GDP.In addition,the CBO projects that by 2015,homeland
security spending will decline to 0.25 percent as a share of
nominal GDP.2
To put these figures in a historical context,we turn to esti-
mates from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that
shed light on homeland security spending in the years before
and after 2001.According to the GAO estimates reported in
Hobijn (2002),federal homeland security spending made up
about 0.1 percent of GDP in the 1996-2001 period.This share
increased to 0.35 percent in 2002 and has remained relatively
stable since.
The GAO numbers provide insight into both the magni-
tude and timing of the increases in public sector security
spending.Federal outlays grew substantially as a share of
GDP in the year after the September 11 attacks.Since 2002,
however,they have increased only modestly.
Unlike federal outlays for homeland security,state and
local government expenditures are not systematically
reported. Although detailed data are available on funds
awarded to states and urban areas under the Department of
Homeland Security’s (2006) Homeland Security Grant
Program (HSGP),these outlays are already accounted for in the
federal homeland security spending numbers reported above.3
Information about additional state and local government
2
1A fiscal year (FY) runs from October 1 through September 30.So,fiscal year
2007 runs from October 1,2006,through September 30,2007.
2See U.S.Congressional Budget Office (2006).This forecast is based on data
that do not include the outlay numbers presented in U.S.Office of Management
and Budget (2006).
3We were able to obtain data on security-related spending outside of the HSGP
program for only two states.Data for the Vermont Homeland Security Unit (HSU)
show a steady increase in grant provisions until FY 2005,when the state HSU
reported its first decline in grant spending.For Vermont HSGP grants,a decline
began in FY 2004.In Florida,overall domestic security spending also began to
drop in FY 2004,and the state’s HSGP grant appropriations declined beginning in
FY 2005.In the case ofboth Vermont and Florida,homeland security spending has
clearly followed a downward trend in recent years.Moreover,a pattern in which
HSGP spending first rises and then falls has been documented for all states.
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2006).
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spending on homeland security is sparse; consequently,we
omit these expenditures from our analysis.
Private Sector Spending on Security
Estimates of the cost of homeland security require an assess-
ment of private sector expenditures as well as government
outlays. Unfortunately, current statistics do not identify
which resources in the private sector are targeted specifically
to homeland security.4We do have data,however,on the frac-
tion of private sector resources devoted to the broader goal of
security in general. These security-related resources are
defined in our analysis as expenditures for protective services
workers and electronic security systems (see box).5 In this
section,we consider how these labor and capital expendi-
tures changed over the 2001-05 period.6
Labor
For our analysis of labor inputs,we report employment and
earnings statistics for protective services workers as a group
and for two subgroups,police officers and security guards.
The statistics are presented for protective services workers
in the economy as a whole and,separately,for those in the
private,or business,sector.7 Using these data,we can assess
whether security-related labor inputs have increased in
importance—in the total economy and in the private sec-
tor—over the 2001-05 period.We do so in two ways:first,by
considering whether employment in protective services has
grown as a share of total employment and,second,by con-
sidering whether the wages of protective services employees
have increased as a fraction of the total wage bill.
Table 1 presents our main findings.From 2001 through
2005,U.S.employment increased from about 128 million to
130 million employees.Over the same period,the number of
protective services employees in the total economy rose from
3.0 million to 3.1 million.Thus,the share of protective serv-
ices employees in total employment has remained fairly con-
stant at 2.3 percent.Moreover,the Bureau of Labor Statistics
7In our analysis,we use business sector data to proxy for private sector data
when necessary.The two sectors are largely equivalent,although the private sec-
tor includes nonprofit institutions while the business sector typically does not.
4Identification of these resources might be impossible in practice,because firms
themselves do not account for them and typically have no business reason to do so.
5Security-related expenditures in the private sector were similarly defined in
Hobijn (2002).
6In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks,the Interagency Paper on Sound
Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System et al.2003) identified best practices for
minimizing the systemic effects of financial market disruptions and established
time frames within which firms were expected to implement these practices.To
meet these time frames,key firms were asked to establish geographically dis-
persed backup facilities in order to prevent a substantial shutdown of clearance
and settlement operations in the case of a catastrophic event. While this request
was aimed at financial firms,other firms may have acted on their own to create
backup services.We do not have the data to quantify these backup costs directly,
but in theory they are reflected in part by our private capital and labor cost esti-
mates. However,because security spending constitutes only a fraction of the cost
of setting up backup facilities,we do not capture the total cost. This limitation
leads to an unfortunate downward bias in our overall estimate.
Labor: Protective Services Occupationsa
Category 33 of the Standard Occupational Classification.
Consists mainly of firefighters, police officers, correctional
officers, private detectives, and security guards.
Capital: Electronic Security Systemsb
Electronic access control, anti-burglary, closed-circuit
television, fire protection, systems integration, and home
automation.
aAs defined in U.S.Department of Labor,Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005).
bAs defined in Security Sales and Integration (2006).
Protective Activities in the Private Sector
Table 1
Employment and Earnings in Protective Services
Occupations,2001-05
Total Economy Private Sectora
2001 2005 2014 2001 2005
Employment (Thousands)
All U.S.employees 127,980 130,308 164,540 117,943 120,868
Protective services employees 2,958 3,057 3,578 1,227 1,203
Police officers 606 629 743 11 16
Security guards 996 994 1144 972 947
Average Annual Earnings (Dollars)
All U.S.employees 34,020 37,870 — 33,535 37,372
Protective services employees 32,530 35,750 — 21,586 23,830
Police officers 41,984 47,295 — 33,583 42,422
Security guards 20,460 22,690 — 20,349 22,468
Percentage of Total Employment 
Protective services employees 2.31 2.35 2.17 1.04 1.00
Police officers 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.01 0.01
Security guards 0.78 0.76 0.70 0.82 0.78
Earnings as a Percentage of Total Wage Bill
Protective services employees 2.21 2.21 — 0.67 0.63
Police officers 0.58 0.60 — 0.01 0.01
Security guards 0.47 0.46 — 0.50 0.47
Source:U.S.Department of Labor,Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001,2005,2006a).
Note:Employment figures for 2014 are projections.
aValues for the private sector are based on data for the U.S.business sector.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2
(2006a) expects this share to decline to 2.2 percent in 2014.
In the private sector,where roughly 80 percent of protective
services employees are security guards,the share of workers
employed in protective services occupations has also held
steady,at 1.0 percent in both 2001 and 2005.
The fact that the employment share of security workers
has changed little does not necessarily mean,however,that
the share of resources devoted to such workers has remained
constant.For example,an increase in relative wages—pre-
sumably reflecting a rise in the qualifications of protective
services workers—would boost the share of resources.
Nevertheless,we find that the hourly earnings of protec-
tive services workers have declined slightly compared with
those of the average U.S.employee.Specifically,hourly earn-
ings of U.S.protective services employees increased 9.9 per-
cent between 2001 and 2005,in contrast to the 11.3 percent
increase seen by the average U.S.worker.As a result,protec-
tive services employees accounted for roughly 2.2 percent of
the U.S.wage bill both in 2001 and in 2005.In the private
sector,moreover,protective services workers’share of the
wage bill even fell slightly,from 0.7 percent to 0.6 percent.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the share of labor
inputs devoted to protective services has not increased since
the September 11 attacks. Moreover, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics does not expect such an increase to occur in the
next decade.
Capital
There are no official government statistics on how many capi-
tal goods are used primarily for security purposes.Thus,to
gauge whether the use of security-oriented capital inputs
increased over the 2001-05 period,we turn to trade associa-
tion data for the electronic security market published by
Security Sales and Integration (2006).The types of electronic
systems covered by these statistics are listed in the box.
In 2001,there were 30.1 million electronic security sys-
tems,commercial and residential,installed and monitored by
the electronic security industry.Four years later,this number
had grown to 30.8 million.While more security systems were
in place in 2005,the increase of0.7 million during the 2001-05
period fell far short of the 4.7 million increase that occurred
from 1997 to 2001.Thus,we conclude that investment in the
U.S.electronic security-related capital stock has not accelerated
significantly since September 11,2001.
Nevertheless,the average price of a security system has
increased,rising from $6,100 in 2001 to $9,900 in 2005.This
price increase presumably reflects both upgrades in the
quality of the systems installed and changes in dealers’pric-
ing strategies in response to demand shifts in recent years.
If we narrow our focus to those security systems installed
for commercial and industrial use by the private sector,we
calculate that the replacement value of these systems
increased from about $116 billion in 2001 to about $193 bil-
lion in 2005.8 This increase was almost entirely due to the
rise in the average price per system.
However,because firms have generally not replaced all of
their security systems,they have not paid the entirety of the
replacement cost reported just above.To obtain an estimate
of the cost flow involved in owning these capital goods,we
consider their cost as their amortization at a 6 percent inter-
est rate over twenty years.9 From this exercise,we calculate
that electronic security capital costs increased from $9.4 bil-
lion to $16.6 billion over the 2001-05 period.
Total Direct Costs
If we sum the homeland security expenditures reported in the
preceding sections,we find that cumulative expenditures rose
from $56 billion (0.55 percent of GDP) in 2001 to $99.5 billion
(0.80 percent of GDP) in 2005 (Table 2).Increases in federal
government outlays on homeland security priorities account
for a sizable 78.5 percent of this overall rise.
Private sector costs climbed from approximately $36 bil-
lion to $45 billion.But as a fraction ofprivate sector GDP,these
expenditures changed little,accounting for 0.46 percent in
both 2001 and 2005.Similarly,as a fraction of economywide
nominal GDP,private sector labor and capital expenditures
4
8We use historical market demand shares to estimate the replacement value of
the electronic security capital stock in the private sector.
9We have chosen to calculate the cost of capital as an amortized replacement
value.This choice means that our calculations do not include depreciation and
maintenance costs,for which there are no satisfactory estimates.
Table 2
Increases in Direct Costs of Homeland Security
Share of
Cost Economywide GDP
(Billions of Dollars) (Percentage) Change in Cost
As Percentage
Billions of of Change in
Item 2001 2005 2001 2005 Dollars Total Direct Cost
Public sector
Federal homeland 
security budget 20.1 54.3 0.20 0.44 34.2 78.5
Private sector
Security-related 
labor inputs 26.5 28.7 0.26 0.23 2.2 5.1
Security-related 
capital inputsa 9.4 16.6 0.09 0.13 7.2 16.5
Total direct cost 56.0 99.5 0.55 0.80 43.6 100.0
Source:Authors’calculations.
aBased on amortization replacement value of electronic security systems at a 6 percent
interest rate over twenty years.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 5
together showed a net increase of only 0.01 percent over the
2001-05 period: the wage bill for protection workers
declined 0.03 percent in these years while the replacement
value of capital increased 0.04 percent.Overall,then,we find
very little evidence of a substantial shift in the fraction of
resources that the private sector applies to security-related
activities.
To be sure,the estimates of input costs presented here
should be taken with some caution.First,the lack of data on
state and local outlays for homeland security means that we
underestimate total public sector expenditures and may
understate the growth of spending.Second,because our pri-
vate sector measures include labor and capital expenditures
devoted to the broad goal of “protection” rather than to
homeland security more narrowly,our estimates for the pri-
vate sector could be high.Finally,our capital stock results are
based on limited data and specific assumptions.
Nevertheless,while the limitations of our data imply that
we might misclassify certain expenditures,our calculations
do effectively compare the same expenditures for both 2001
and 2005.On this basis,we can assert with reasonable confi-
dence that aside from federal government spending on
homeland security,security-related expenditures have not
accelerated over the last five years.
Sector-Specific Evidence on Security Costs
Recognizing the limitations of our total cost calculations,we
present some additional,sector-specific evidence on secu-
rity expenditures.Although direct evidence of most sectors’
expenditures is sparse, the commercial real estate sector
makes available detailed statistics on security and insurance
costs. Specifically, the Building Owners and Managers
Association International (1993-2006) produces annual
reports on security and insurance costs per square foot of
rentable commercial space.10The data are particularly inter-
esting because the World Trade Center,one of the targets of
the September 11 attacks,was commercial real estate; thus,
in this sector more than in others,one might expect to see a
marked rise in security spending.
In fact,security costs per square foot of rentable space do
show a clear upward trend (Chart 2). From 1992 to 2001,
security costs went up 25 percent,from $0.39 to $0.49 per
square foot.From 2001 to 2005,security costs rose another
10 percent,reaching $0.55.Significantly,however,security
costs in the commercial real estate sector have increased
approximately at the rate of inflation.Thus,there is little evi-
dence of a substantial shift in resources toward security
expenditures in this sector—a finding that is consistent with
our earlier results for the nation as a whole.
As for insurance costs,they too appear to have increased
substantially since 2001:they are up from $0.18 to $0.32 per
square foot of rentable space.Since the major increase in
insurance costs occurred after 2001,we can reasonably infer
that some portion of the increase is due to the perceived
threat of terrorism.11 Nevertheless, the higher costs may
reflect an increase in the average price of insurance policies
as well as a move toward more extensive coverage.Thus,even
when we consider this more detailed sector-level data,we
find no clear-cut evidence of extensive increases in security-
related costs since 2001.
Macroeconomic Impact of Homeland Security Spending
Another measure of the cost of homeland security is its
effect on economic activity.If homeland security initiatives
have diverted substantial resources from other uses and
induced businesses to take precautionary actions,then one
would expect economic growth to slow and firms to estab-
lish a buffer stock of materials and final products.These
outcomes would,in turn,be reflected in such indicators as
lower output and higher inventories.
We consider first how productivity,or output per hour,
has fared.A private sector that was devoting sizable amounts
of time and money to security-related activities that yielded 10Although insurance expenditures do not constitute a tangible input,they do
in fact entail opportunity costs in the sense that payments of insurance premi-
ums involve administrative costs and may drain cash—a particular problem
for financially constrained firms.Otherwise,the payment of insurance premi-
ums and payouts are contingent transfers.
Source: Building Owners and Managers Association International (1993-2006).
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11Insurance costs per square foot of rentable space also increased after the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2
no measured output would see a decline in the rate of pro-
ductivity growth.Although it is hard to isolate the effect of
homeland security from all other influences on productivity,
we do know that productivity growth in fact accelerated,
rather than decelerated,over the 2001-05 period.Indeed,the
average productivity growth rate in the U.S.nonfarm busi-
ness sector rose from 2.6 percent in 1996-2001 to 3.3 percent
in 2002-05, a significant increase (Chart 3). These trends
suggest,then,that while homeland security efforts might
have had a small negative effect on productivity,the effect
has been overshadowed by other mechanisms that drive U.S.
economic growth.12
Second,we consider how inventory levels have changed.
We might expect that after 2001,firms would build a buffer
stock of inventories that would allow them to continue pro-
duction and to supply their customers in the event that their
own supply chain was interrupted.13 However, a look at the
inventory-to-sales ratio (I-S ratio) for the U.S.business sec-
tor from 1992 to the present suggests that firms are not
maintaining substantial buffer stocks (Chart 4).After filter-
ing out seasonal effects with a twelve-month moving aver-
age,we find that inventory-to-sales ratios have been steadily
declining over the last fifteen years. There was indeed a
slight uptick in the I-S ratio relative to trend after 2001—
reflecting, perhaps, a move by the automobile and other
industries to create buffer stocks in the immediate aftermath
of September 11—but the I-S ratio appears to have returned
to its pre-2001 trend path of decline.Given this evidence,we
conclude that any buildup in buffer stock inventories was
transitory and that the goods accumulated have since been
sold off.
Productivity and I-S ratios are the two indicators most
likely to reflect the broader economic impact of increased
private sector security activities.Since neither appears to
have been substantially affected,it is unlikely that homeland
security efforts have contributed significantly to any slow-
down in U.S.economic activity since 2001.
Conclusion
We find little evidence to suggest that increases in homeland
security spending have led to far larger costs for the overall
U.S.economy.While the share of homeland security spend-
ing in GDP rose from 0.55 percent in 2001 to 0.80 percent
in 2005—an increase stemming in large part from the
$34.2 billion step-up in the federal government budget on
homeland security—spending on security-related inputs in
the private sector does not seem to have increased as a fraction
of private sector GDP. Instead, it has remained constant at
about 0.46 percent.Moreover,forecasts by the Congressional
Budget Office and the Bureau ofLabor Statistics indicate that
we should not expect a major shift in resources toward
homeland security activities in the next decade.Finally,our
look at output and inventory levels in the 2001-05 period
suggests that homeland security outlays have not signifi-
cantly constrained U.S.economic activity.
In concluding,we note that our analysis is intended as a
purely descriptive exercise; we offer no normative assess-
ments of the adequacy of current spending on homeland
security.Although no major terrorist attacks have occurred
on U.S.soil between 2001 and 2005,we are not in a position
6
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006b).
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12These mechanisms are discussed in more detail in Jorgenson,Ho,and Stiroh
(2004).
13Griffy-Brown (2003) contains an illustrative discussion of how firms could go
about developing better ways of dealing with supply chain disruptions.to attribute this to the spending patterns reported in our
study. Similarly, we have no grounds for saying that the
resources we have identified as targeted to homeland secu-
rity would ensure a sufficient response to a hypothetical
future attack.
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